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Abstract 
 
This dissertation focuses primarily in investment arbitration and the several 
procedural vehicles through which review of awards is realised. It examines the 
various procedural options that the parties in investment arbitration may deploy in 
cases where a frustrated party seeks to annul or set aside an award, which does not 
satisfy his interests.  
 
These procedural review mechanisms have mainly been created to enhance 
transparency and consistency in the decision – making process. They ultimately 
provide for a higher level of legitimacy with the arbitration system. However, as you 
go through this paper, you will observe the specified way prescribed by the various 
legal instruments, that these mechanisms operate. They are essentially based on a 
limited and restrained function of the review process, with limited and narrowly – 
interpreted grounds for review of awards. In this way, finality of awards, as the 
ultimate purpose of all investment treaties and legal instruments, is fostered and the 
advantages of investment arbitration are preserved; efficiency and speed of the 
proceedings.  
 
This paper also highlights the importance of consistency and correctness of arbitral 
decisions, which eventually cannot be absolutely sacrificed for finality. After all, it is 
legal certainty and accuracy of the decision – making that contribute to an increased 
legitimacy of the system. In this context, the practice and roles of ad hoc Committees 
in ICSID annulment procedure will be analysed, especially through past and recent 
practice, with reference to cases of utmost significance. 
 
Reference has also been made to the possibility of reform of the system, by 
introducing a more substantive review of awards mainly through an appellate 
mechanism. As interesting and outstanding as it may look, this is quite unlikely for 
the time being, since investors and States have a keen desire to – as Mr Gaillard has 
stated - ‘close the books’ of a case instead of giving rise to perpetual proceedings. 
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Introduction 
 
 
International arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution method has indisputably 
thrived over the years, with particular focus given on international investment 
arbitration, mainly owing to several practical advantages; it has been defined as a 
time-efficient, confidential, flexible regime premised on the expertise of skilled 
practitioners. In 2012, the number of known treaty-based disputes that were initiated 
amounted to 58, being the highest number of investment disputes filed in one year.1 
The latter illustrates the greater confidence and importance that investors have 
attached on investor – State arbitration. It must be noted that the driving force behind 
this consequential growth of investment arbitration is the gradual evolution of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), which according to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) is deemed to be the key element of international 
economic integration and development.2 
 
This great success of international investment arbitration lies on the long accepted 
concept that arbitral awards carry with them the notions of finality and fairness.3 Put 
differently, the scope of review of the awards remains limited in all States with a well 
– established legal system and has been seen as a last resort in cases where the 
parties’ legal rights have undoubtedly been frustrated. However, the increasing review 
of the awards and its potential implications on the above – mentioned notions is a 
reality in the context of international investment arbitration. Tangible proof of this is 
the annulment regime that has been developed in contract and treaty – arbitrations and 
it is the purpose of this paper to address this issue in depth. 
 
Below, the graphic display illustrates the gradual increase of investor – State cases 
filed within 2012, as compared with the previous years. Pursuant to the 2012 
statistical update of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.unctad.org/diae  2	  http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2013-2	  http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2013-
en/04/02/01/index.html?itemId=/content/chapter/factbook-2013-34-en  
3 The Review of International Arbitral Awards, IAI Series no6 (E. Gaillard ed., 2010) 
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(UNCTAD), the overwhelming majority of respondents correspond to developing or 
in transition economies, while the majority of cases were still initiated by developed 
countries.4 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Known ISDS cases5 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 http://www.unctad.org/diae	  
5 http://www.unctad.org/diae 
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39 of the 58 investor – State disputes were filed with the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), seven were initiated under the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules and 
five were filed with the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). The International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Cairo Regional Centre for International 
Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA) were allocated one case each. One case was not 
institutional (ad hoc arbitration) and the venues of five cases were unknown.6  
 
 
 
1. Favor Arbitrandum 
 
The perceived function of investment arbitration as an extremely efficient dispute 
resolution regime for investor – State disputes, has deterred the various national legal 
systems from attaching much weight to review or annulment proceedings with respect 
to arbitral awards. It is rather a matter of proper balance between the ultimate goals of 
arbitration; finality and fairness.7 On the one hand, finality of awards that allows the 
settlement of disputes to be achieved by means of limited review mechanisms; on the 
other hand, fairness and correctness of awards, which inevitably contribute to the 
viability of arbitration itself and can definitely be assured through a minimum judicial 
(or not) review.  
This favor arbitrandum is also reflected in the global trend of national legislatures to 
lay down arbitration laws, entailing limited review mechanisms and grounds for 
challenge of arbitral awards.8 More illustratively, when several grounds for resisting 
enforcement or for challenging an award exist, these are usually, if not always, 
interpreted narrowly and restrictively, with the overwhelming majority of States being 
proponents of this long accepted proposition in the investment arbitration community. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 http://www.unctad.org/diae 
7 The Review of International Arbitral Awards, supra fn. 3	  
8 The Review of International Arbitral Awards, supra fn. 3  
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2. State sovereignty as the most important legal hurdle to the actual 
execution of awards – One step before annulment and enforcement review 
 
We can see a growing number of concluded bilateral investment treaties and other 
investment treaties today, mainly owing to the recognition of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) as a crucial element for economic growth globally. 
 
What truly distinguishes these treaties is the fact that they tend to function 
independently, without being subject to political interference of either host or home-
governments. However, host-governments’ exercise of political or regulatory powers 
is sometimes instigated by the need to preserve their sovereign immunity to external 
factors. It must be noted though, that this is the ultimate objective of these treaties, 
and as Wälde said, “Investment treaties as international law disciplines interfere in 
domestic regulatory and administrative sovereignty; that is their very purpose”.9 
 
The constant exercise of a state’s regulatory powers undoubtedly stems from the 
emergence of a particular form that - the previously administrative state - has taken: 
the form of the regulatory state.10 Nowadays, in societies where the element of risk is 
diminished, regulations gain a preponderant role and confirm the regulatory character 
of the state, which possesses the constitutional power to redefine the major conflict 
between private interests and public interest. As a matter of fact, nothing is more 
incompatible with a state’s ultimate goals towards economic development than a 
continuous persistence to the status quo. 
 
When this sovereign immunity is substantially deployed by States as a major shield 
against the execution of “unfriendly” awards, a perpetual battle between the investor 
and the State concerned begins and arbitration proceedings are instituted which could 
later possibly lead to annulment applications. There are obviously cases where the 
investor has engaged in annulment applications as a defense against an award that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Wälde T. W. Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of Selected Key 
Issues Based on Recent Litigation Experience”  in Nobert Horn and Stefan Kröll, Arbitrating Foreign 
Investment Disputes, 2004 
10 Santiago Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 2012	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seems to harm his own legitimate interests. When initiating such procedures, one 
must bear in mind that the annulment regime was not designed to afford a second 
chance to the looser, but primarily to enhance the integrated notions of an award; 
finality and correctness. These two notions and the consequential dichotomy affecting 
the annulment regime will be addressed a little later in this paper. At first, reference 
must be made to the various annulment procedures that derive from investment 
treaties, multilateral or bilateral, and investment agreements between investors and 
States. 
 
 
 
3. Different systems of review  
 
A. Judicial Review of Awards – Enforcement Review 
 
As Seneca once quoted “Errare humamun est, sed in errore perseverare dementis”, 
meaning that errors are undoubtedly human, but non-rectification of the error is 
substantially in contrast with the human nature and is deemed to be demented.11 
Arbitrators are skilled practitioners who administer justice pursuant to well and long – 
established legal maxims but at the same time, without being able to completely 
overcome their own temperamental inclinations. Consequently, it is of fundamental 
importance for their decisions to be checked and reviewed in the context of limited 
interventions on behalf of the courts or other legally authorised bodies.  
 
It is, however, validly argued that judicial interference is contrary to the very purpose 
and concept of international arbitration.12 The mere fact that parties chose to arbitrate 
their dispute and not to submit it to courts reflects their explicit expression of 
preference towards arbitration as a dispute resolution method and the potential 
exclusion of court interference. It also indicates their pure need for finality regarding 
the settlement of their dispute; in other words, the resubmission of the dispute to 
courts on the basis of a challenge or an application to set aside the award, simply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Juan Fernadez – Armesto, Different Systems for the Annulment of Investment Awards, 2010 
12 Juan Fernadez – Armesto, supra fn. 11 
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wipes out the cost – efficient nature of arbitration and leads to perpetual proceedings, 
depriving the system of its ultimate virtue: finality. 
 
In treaty arbitration, an investor has usually plenty of options as regards the 
procedural vehicles through which arbitration proceedings will be conducted. As a 
consequence, consideration should be given to the review mechanism following each 
specific regime. As complex as it may seem, the choice will essentially vary between 
an arbitral tribunal operating under the ICSID rules or an arbitral tribunal operating 
under the rules of the ICSID Additional Facility, United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, ICC or other.13 It is worthy of remark that most of the 
institutional arbitration rules entail provisions that lay down restricted and limited 
grounds for review of the awards, thus finality of the awards is substantially 
fostered.14 
 
Typically, non – ICSID awards can be challenged and reviewed through national 
courts.15 Put differently, when institutional and contract restrictions are out of the 
picture, awards can be reviewed under two different jurisdictions16: i) in the courts of 
the State where the award was rendered or under the law of which the award was 
issued and ii) in the courts of the State where enforcement of the award is sought. 
 
Given the vast scholarly commentaries and research on the dichotomy caused by the 
two ostensibly conflicting notions, these of finality and review, judges are usually 
cautious and feel restrained to abide by the restricted maxims on annulment and 
review of awards. Moreover, it is globally noticeable that national adjudicators show 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Gaetan Verhoosel, Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards: To ICSID or Not to 
ICSID, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International 
Arbitration Conference, ICCA Congress Series, 2009 Dublin Volume 14 (Kluwer Law International 
2009), pp 285 – 317  
14 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION, arts. 28(6), 29(2), 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdf_documents/rules/rules_arb_english.pdf ; 
LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, LCIA ARBITRATION RULES, arts. 
26.9, 27.1, http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/  
15 Christoph Schreuer, ICSID Annulment Revisited, Kluwer Law International 2003 
16 Thomas W. Walsh, 2006, Substantive Review of ICSID Awards: Is the Desire for Accuracy Sufficient 
to Compromise Finality?, Berkeley Journal of international Law  
	   7	  
a high level of deference towards arbitral tribunals and their decisions.17 The mere 
fact that partial annulment takes precedence over annulment of the whole award 
functions as a confirmation of this favor arbitrandum.18 
 
Review in the courts of the “seat” of arbitration is usually dependent on the State’s 
arbitration statute. Some jurisdictions allow for complete finality of awards19 on the 
basis of “exclusion agreements” concluded by the parties who aim at waiving ex ante 
any rights to set aside an award. For example, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has 
accepted that waiver. The Federal Tribunal, notwithstanding the previous position, 
declared as invalid an alleged ex ante waiver in Saluka, claiming that despite the fact 
that the BIT provided for and confirmed the finality of the award, this confirmation 
could not prove sufficient to establish a waiver.20 
 
The most common grounds for review consist of issues of legitimacy of process, the 
validity of the arbitration agreement, the proper constitution of the tribunal and 
violation of due process. Nevertheless, the substantive part of the decision remains 
out of reach for the courts, enhancing in that way the finality of awards. 
 
Challenging an award in the place where is sought to be enforced means primarily 
confronting the New York Convention and its list consisting of limited and narrowly 
interpreted grounds for review and refusal of enforcement of an award. Article V of 
the New York Convention affords courts the power to review awards on the basis of 
some exhaustive grounds; violation of due process, proper notice of arbitration, public 
policy, incapacity of parties, invalidity of arbitration agreement etc.21 One must not 
disregard the fact that here again, the substantive correctness of the merits of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Juan Fernadez – Armesto, Different Systems for the Annulment of Investment Awards, 2010 
18 The Review of International Arbitral Awards, supra fn. 3 
19 Thomas W. Walsh, 2006, Substantive Review of ICSID Awards: Is the Desire for Accuracy Sufficient 
to Compromise Finality?, Berkeley Journal of international Law 
20 Gaetan Verhoosel, Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards: To ICSID or Not to 
ICSID, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International 
Arbitration Conference, ICCA Congress Series, 2009 Dublin Volume 14 (Kluwer Law International 
2009), pp 285 – 317 
21 Convention on the Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards (June 10, 1985) (New 
York Convention) 
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award does not fall within the court review.22 As a result, the finality of the awards is 
enhanced through a minimum, to the possible extent, court interference. 
 
The role of the UNCITRAL Model Law is eminent in the context of review of 
awards, as recourse to it is sought in cases where setting aside or refusal of 
enforcement of an award is pursued. The United Nations legal instrument for 
arbitration provides for a limited number of grounds for review23, sticking to the well 
– established concept of favor arbitrandum and promoting finality of awards.  
 
As a matter of fact, parties tend to choose a neutral, arbitration – friendly forum for 
the conduct of the proceedings, also taking into account several important factors, 
including the expertise of national judges as well as their stance towards arbitration.24 
In this case, unforeseeable and unreasonable annulments of awards are avoided and 
international arbitration manages to stand on some kind of impenetrable foundations.  
 
 
 
B. Function of Annulment Under the ICSID Regime 
 
The review of awards under the ICSID regime must be distinguished from 
enforcement review through national courts, as it carries with it some extremely 
distinctive features. It is a self – contained system of review operating under the 
auspices of ICSID.  The annulment mechanism is said to serve a public aim; to 
protect the integrity and the quality of the ICSID system. As a consequence, it is not 
only private interest concerns that constitute the underlying basis in ICSID 
arbitrations and annulment procedures. At first, annulment is essentially a mechanism 
that offers the opportunity to address procedural flaws. As we can see from the 
exhaustively listed grounds for annulment under Article 52 of the Washington 
Convention as mentioned above, we can distinguish three categories of procedural 
flaws; i) integrity of the arbitral tribunal, ii) integrity of the procedure and iii) integrity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Thomas W. Walsh, 2006, Substantive Review of ICSID Awards: Is the Desire for Accuracy Sufficient 
to Compromise Finality?, Berkeley Journal of international Law 
23 Christoph Schreuer, ICSID Annulment Revisited, Kluwer Law International 2003 
24 Juan Fernadez – Armesto, supra fn. 11 
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of the award.25 Thus, an award can be broadly protected against procedural errors 
under the ICSID Convention. 
 
As a matter of fact, although public policy violations constitute a valid and much used 
ground for review and refusal of enforcement under the New York Convention, 
Article V(2)(a) and under the UNCITRAL Model Law in its Article 34(2), the ICSID 
Convention does not make any reference per se regarding public policy violation.  
 
Moreover, although review of the merits of ICSID awards is not foreseen, ad hoc 
Committees when addressing, for instance, whether the tribunal exceeded its powers 
failing to apply the proper law or whether its reasoning does not correspond to its 
conclusions, it sometimes, though inevitably, overstep its narrow mandate and comes 
very close to interfering with the merits of the decision.26 
 
 
C. Annulment versus Enforcement Review 
 
As mentioned above, an investor who seeks redress in investment arbitration is 
afforded a variety of procedural options under investment treaties. This discretionary 
choice on behalf of the investor proves to be a pivotal value in investment treaty 
arbitration, as the investor has the opportunity to engage in any type of arbitration that 
best suits his specific interests and serves his purpose. Typically, the choice will vary 
between an arbitration conducted under the ICSID Rules or the ICSID Additional 
Facility, UNCITRAL, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce or ICC Rules.27  
 
There seems to be several differences between the various institutions with respect to 
the administration of the proceedings as well as the challenge of the awards. On the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Schuetz, C. C. Legitimacy and Inconsistency: Is Investment Arbitration Broken and Can It Be 
“Fixed”? Is the ICSID Annulment Mechanism Broken and Could It Be Improved? In ? in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration and International Law Vol. 3 (Ian A. Laird, Todd J. Weiler eds) 2010 
26 Schuetz, C. C., supra fn. 25	  
27 Gaetan Verhoosel, Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards: To ICSID or Not to 
ICSID, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International 
Arbitration Conference, ICCA Congress Series, 2009 Dublin Volume 14 (Kluwer Law International 
2009), pp 285 – 317 
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one hand, the ICSID regime offers plenty of advantages with its self – contained 
system of review and on the other hand court intervention in non – ICSID 
proceedings appears to be more prominent.  
 
For example, in ICSID arbitration proceedings the standards for annulment are quite 
strictly laid down in the text of the Convention and the need for legal certainty can be 
satisfied in a higher degree. In non – ICSID arbitration on the other hand, the 
determination of the standards of review will usually depend on the “seat” of the 
arbitration and the respective arbitration statutes of the jurisdiction chosen, a concept 
which does not exist under the ICSID regime on the basis that no specific jurisdiction 
constitutes the “seat” of ICSID arbitration.28  ICSID arbitrations are often considered 
to be “seatless arbitrations”, excluding any notions of locus arbitri, which suits 
mostly in commercial arbitration.29 The choice, though, of the place of arbitration is 
not a faculty assigned to the parties in treaty arbitration; treaty tribunals shall most 
often determine the “seat” by choosing a neutral and arbitration – friendly 
jurisdiction. It must be noted that although ICSID regime is considered as an 
autonomous system with a well – established set of rules, this is not always the case in 
contrast with national courts which can validly rely on a wide assortment of similar 
arbitration cases, facilitating the issuance of a decision on the matter at hand. 
 
As far as the discretionary power of annulment and setting aside review is concerned, 
the Washington Convention confers to ad hoc Committees a certain amount of 
discretion regarding the decision on annulment, under Article 52(3) of the 
Convention. Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law also adopts this 
discretionary policy, affording the courts the right to decide on whether a setting aside 
of an award is justified, in case one or more of the grounds have been met.30 
 
Concerning the various standards applied in the review of the awards, reference 
should be made primarily to jurisdictional objections. While courts tend to interpret 
jurisdictional errors by addressing the issue of correctness in the tribunal’s decision 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Juan Fernadez – Armesto, supra fn. 11 
29 Rowan  Platt, “The Appeal of Appeal Mechanisms in International Arbitration: Fairness over 
Finality?”, Journal of International Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International 2013 Volume 30 Issue 5 ) 
pp. 531 - 560 
30 Broches, A., 1990, Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, para. 5 ad Art. 34	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asserting or denying jurisdiction, the ad hoc Committees, adhering to the text of the 
Washington Convention, adopt a more restrictive approach and address mainly the 
issue of whether the manifest excess of powers as to jurisdictional errors. For 
instance, the English High Court in Occidental Petroleum v. Equador interpreted the 
applicable standard of review as follows: “It is now well – established that a challenge 
to the jurisdiction of an arbitration panel under section 67 proceeds by way of a re – 
hearing of the matters before the arbitrators…The test for the Court is this: was the 
tribunal correct in its decision on jurisdiction? The test is not: was the tribunal entitled 
to reach the decision that it did.”31 
Moreover, failure to state reasons32 is regarded as a common ground for annulment in 
ICSID annulment proceedings. For instance, four annulment decisions of ad hoc 
Committees were based on this ground for annulment; namely, the MINE v. 
Government of Guinea case, which was annulled in part; the Mitchell v. Democratic 
Republic of the Congo case, which was annulled in full by asserting that “…Such an 
inadequacy of reasons is deemed to be particularly grave, as it seriously affects the 
coherence of the reasoning and, moreover, as it opens the door to a risk of genuine 
abuses…”33; the Enron v. Argentine Republic case where the award was annulled in 
part and CMS v. Argentine Republic case, also annulled in part.34 
In conclusion, the practice shows that ad hoc Committees tend to see themselves as 
guardians of the ICSID system and essential contributors to international investment 
law and as a result they take a more strict approach during annulment proceedings, 
often seek to correct any perceived errors of law themselves, avoiding the 
undesirable, sometimes, annulment. On the contrary, although courts similarly 
exercise their allocated authorities with proper restraint, they often engage in a more 
deferential approach towards the setting aside of awards and the expertise of the 
tribunals. The two systems of review, although they share many similarities, they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Gaetan Verhoosel, Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards: To ICSID or Not to 
ICSID, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International 
Arbitration Conference, ICCA Congress Series, 2009 Dublin Volume 14 (Kluwer Law International 
2009), pp 285 – 317 
32 Art. 52(2)(e) of the Washington Convention 
33 Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ARB/99/7 
34 Background Paper on Annulment for the Administrative Council of ICSID, 2012 in 
icsid.worldbank.org     
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nevertheless show real differences when ad hoc Committees and courts wield their 
authority in annulment and enforcement review respectively. 
 
4. A Proper Balance Between “Finality” and “Correctness” 
 
A. “Finality” over “Correctness” or Vice-Versa? 
 
In the context of ICSID arbitration, it is now a long accepted suggestion in the 
investment arbitration community that annulment procedure35 and the proper scope of 
review are determined by two seemingly conflicting principles: finality on the one 
hand and correctness, on the other.36 We can find proponents of both of the principles, 
namely those who perceive finality as the ultimate value in arbitration and tend to 
adopt a more restrictive policy when it comes to the scope of review, and those who 
are advocates of correctness and opt for a more amplified scope of review.37 As 
complex as it may be, nothing in this discourse suggests that these two notions are 
deemed to be determinative factors of the annulment committees’ decisions, but 
rather consideration should be paid to a vast amount of complicated factors affecting 
such decisions.38 
 
It is now well – established that investor - State arbitrations have as their primary 
purpose to enhance finality, offering only a limited number of grounds for review and 
fostering the expeditious and economic settlement of disputes.39 Given the vast 
scholarly debate, it is not certainly accurate whether the finality concerns the dispute 
itself or the finality of the awards.40 As a matter of fact, on the understanding that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 annulment procedure as a self-contained process of review, constitutes one of the distinctive features 
of investment arbitration under the Convention on the Settlement of  Investment Disputes Between 
States and National of Other States (ICSID Convention) 
36 Evseev, D., 2008, Living with Indeterminacy: A Practical Approach to ICSID Annulment Reasoning, 
in Juris Conference on International Investment Arbitration; Investment treaty arbitration and 
international law; Vol. 1; T.J. Grierson Weiler, editor 
37 Eric A. Schwatrz, 2004, Finality at What Cost? The Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee in Wena 
Hotels v. Egypt in ANNULMENT OF ICSID AWARDS (Emmannuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi, 
Eds.)  
38 Evseev, D., 2008, Living with Indeterminacy: A Practical Approach to ICSID Annulment Reasoning, 
in Juris Conference on International Investment Arbitration; Investment treaty arbitration and 
international law; Vol. 1; T.J. Grierson Weiler, editor	  
39 C. Schreuer, L. Malintoppi, A. Reinisch, & A. Sinclair, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 1102 
(Cambridge U. Press 2009) 
40 Tai-Heng Cheng, Finality and Justice in ICSID Arbitration 
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finality of awards constitutes one the most significant elements in international 
investment arbitration and the ICSID regime, it can be validly argued that finality 
should only then be compromised, when there is an egregious violation of procedural 
justice. Notably, under the ICSID Convention there is no possibility to appeal an 
award on the merits by means of an annulment application.41 Therefore, an ad hoc 
Committee’s mandate is essentially restricted to a limited review, based on either 
jurisdictional or procedural errors under Article 52(1) of the Convention. 
 
 
B. Ad hoc Committees’ Practice – A Striking Discrepancy in their Approach of 
“Finality” and “Correctness”? 
 
Much criticism revolved around the issue of several ad hoc committees’ decisions, 
where the latter were “accused” of intervening in the merits of the case and exceeding 
in that way their mandate. There have also been some disparities of the much-debated 
issue of the differences between an appeal and an annulment as a result of the ad hoc 
Committee decisions in CMS42 and SEMPRA43. This inconsistency in the decisions 
has been said to radically undermine the legitimacy of the ICSID regime and is 
assumed to be a result of the inherent conflict between the two ambiguous notions; 
finality and correctness.44  
 
On the other hand, there seems to be a completely adverse side. Reference must be 
made to Wena and Vivendi, two historically significant decisions that are considered 
to have altered the previously blurred landscape over annulment decisions. What can 
be drawn from these decisions is an alternative stance on behalf of ad hoc 
Committees that has been noticed; more specifically, it is a matter of borderline cases, 
where the Committees have overestimated efficiency and finality and as a result 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Platt, R., 2013, The Appeal of Appeal Mechanisms in International Arbitration: Fairness over 
Finality?, Journal of International Arbitration, Kluwer Law International 2013 Volume 30 Issue 5, pp. 
531 - 560 
42 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8), Decision on 
Annulment, para. 158, 25 Sep. 2007) 
43 Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16), Decision on Annulment, 
29 Jun. 2010 
44 A. Bjorklund, 2005, The Continuing Appeal of Annulment: Lessons from Amco Asia and CME, in 
International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties 
and Customary International Law 
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undermine their discretionary powers as regards annulment, by interpreting extremely 
narrowly the respective provisions.45 
 
It is worthy of remark that the ICSID Convention itself lists a limited number of 
remedies against an award, reinforcing the view that finality outweighs consistency 
and correctness.46 The text of the Convention provides for an autonomous, self – 
contained system of review, deterring the parties from having recourse to national 
courts. In this regard, Article 53 provides that awards “shall be binding on the parties 
and shall not be subject to any appeal or other remedy except those provided for in 
this Convention”. 
 
As Dr. Emmanuel Gaillard has noted, parties value the ability to “close the books” on 
a case and put it behind within a reasonable time.47 Investor’s preference for finality 
over correctness can be justified by the fact that in most of the cases, the outcome 
favors the investor over the State – party to the arbitration. The investors, however, do 
bear in mind that incorrect arbitral decisions have been issued, as the notorious Czech 
Republic cases and the ICSID case SGS v. Pakistan. Similarly with the SGS case, the 
Lauder case have surprisingly brought commentators to the conclusion that much 
more importance should be attached to consistency and correctness, rather than to 
finality of awards; in this way, they believe the legitimacy of the ICSID process will 
be ensured.48 
 
As has been noticed by Evseev, the principle of correctness usually seems to go hand 
in hand with the notion of consistency.49 It is also noticeable that consistency 
promotes accuracy and legal certainty as regards arbitral decisions. It is true that when 
ad hoc Committees have as their quest the correctness of awards, they indeed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 IAI INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SERIES No.1, ANNULMENT OF ICSID AWARDS, E. 
Gaillard and Y. Banifatemi eds. 2004 
46 Clapham, J., 2009, “Finality of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: Has the Tide Turned and is there a 
Need for Reform?”, Journal of International Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International 2009 Volume 26 
Issue 3 ) pp. 437 - 466	  
47 Evseev, D., 2008, Living with Indeterminacy: A Practical Approach to ICSID Annulment Reasoning, 
in Juris Conference on International Investment Arbitration; Investment treaty arbitration and 
international law; Vol. 1; T.J. Grierson Weiler, editor 
48 Jason Clapham, “Finality of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: Has the Tide Turned and is there a Need 
for Reform?”, Journal of International Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International 2009 Volume 26 Issue 
3 ) pp. 437 - 466 
49	  Evseev, D., supra fn. 47	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contribute to the legitimacy of the ICSID regime by promoting a high level of 
accuracy in their decisions. Arbitrators are skilled practitioners trained and equipped 
to serve the uniformity of law. Nevertheless, taking also into account that there is not 
any binding legal precedent in international arbitration, one should wonder why so 
much weight is attributed to consistency within the system. On the contrary, there are 
several other significant factors affecting annulment decisions and their outcome, that 
a lingering concentration on a perpetual discussion over the notions of finality and 
correctness can only constitute an abstraction from the arguments actually put forward 
and can add some value to the case at hand.  
 
 
 
 
5. The ICSID System and The ad hoc Committee’s Mandate 
 
A. Restrained powers of the ad hoc Committees under the ICSID Convention 
 
The vast majority of investment disputes until today have been submitted to the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); by the end of 
2012, this number was equal to 314 cases brought under the ICSID Convention and 
the ICSID Additional Facility rules, out of 514 known treaty – based cases on the 
whole.50 Over the years, this evolution has transformed ICSID arbitration into an 
outstanding legal system for the settlement of the overwhelming majority of 
investment disputes.51 
 
The annulment procedure under the ICSID system was designed primarily to confer 
on the ad hoc Committees limited powers of review, these being restricted to 
procedural errors in the decision, thus excluding any review on the merits and 
waiving any right of recourse to national courts.52 This is justified taking into 
consideration the fundamental goal of the ICSID system: to promote the finality of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 http://www.unctad.org/diae 
51 Gaillard, E., 2004, The Extent of Review of the Applicable law in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
Annulment of ICSID awards, iai series on international arbitration no1	  
52 Platt, R., 2013, “The Appeal of Appeal Mechanisms in International Arbitration: Fairness over 
Finality?”, Journal of International Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International 2013 Volume 30 Issue 5 ) 
pp. 531 - 560 
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awards.53 As the Committee held in Vivendi v. Argentine Republic: “It is agreed by all 
that Article 52 does not introduce an appeal facility but only a facility meant to 
uphold and strengthen the integrity of the ICSID process”; similarly in Mitchell v. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo the Committee noted that: “No one has the 
slightest doubt – all the ad hoc Committees have so stated, and all authors 
specializing in the ICSID arbitration system agree – that an annulment proceeding is 
different from an appeal procedure and that it does not entail the carrying out of a 
substantive review of an award.” also, in Continental Casualty v. Argentine Republic 
the Committee’s decision reinforced the above statements by holding that: “An ICSID 
award is not subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in 
the ICSID Convention. In annulment proceedings under Article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention, an ad hoc committee is thus not a court of appeal, and cannot consider 
the substance of the dispute, but can only determine whether the award should be 
annulled on one of the grounds in Article 52(1).”  
The investor’s choice to pursue an annulment simply allows him to ensure at a higher 
level the existence of integrity and correctness in the decision – making process, 
undermining, even temporarily, as Mr Evseev has noted, the finality of the award at 
hand. The annulment procedure is the only available remedy for challenging an 
ICSID award and this is illustrated in the text of the Convention itself under its Article 
53(1): “The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any 
appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention.”54 
 
A. The ad hoc Committees’ approach through recent case law and practice 
The self – contained annulment procedure must be distinguished from any appellate 
mechanism which would require a review on the substantive part of a tribunal’s 
decision; instead, as mentioned above, the ad hoc Committee’s task is essentially 
restrained in identifying any procedural flaws in the decision and either exercising its 
discretionary power to annul the award, or merely declaring those discrepancies as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Background Paper on Annulment for the Administrative Council of ICSID, 2012 in 
icsid.worldbank.org     
54 C. Schreuer, L. Malintoppi, A. Reinisch, & A. Sinclair, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 1102 
(Cambridge U. Press 2009) 
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insufficient to justify an annulment. The ad hoc Committee can exercise its 
discretionary power and either annul an award fully or in part and evidence of this 
statement is provided through a variety of decisions; in Vivendi v. Argentine Republic, 
for instance, the ad hoc Committee upheld this rationale and ruled as follows: 
“[W]here a ground for annulment is established, it is for the ad hoc committee, and 
not the requesting party, to determine the extent of the annulment. In making this 
determination, the committee is not bound by the applicant’s characterisation of its 
request, whether in the original application or otherwise, as requiring either complete 
or partial annulment of the award.”55 Uniformly, in SEMPRA v. Argentine Republic, 
the ad hoc Committee’s stance was more or less the same: “Once an ad hoc 
committee has concluded that there is one instance of manifest excess of powers (or 
any other ground for annulment), which warrants annulment of the Award in its 
entirety, this will be the end of the ad hoc committee’s examination. Since annulment 
of an award in its entirety necessarily leads to the loss of the res judicata effect of all 
matters adjudicated by the Tribunal, it is unnecessary to consider whether there are 
other grounds - whether in respect of the same matter or other matters - that may also 
lead to annulment. On the other hand, an ad hoc committee will need to proceed 
differently where it decides not to annul the Award or decides to annul the Award 
only in part. In those instances it will be necessary for the ad hoc committee to 
examine all of the grounds invoked by the applicant in support of its application.”56  
Moreover, ad hoc Committees have shown much deference to this strict interpretation 
of their mandate; for example in Consortium v. Kingdom of Morocco, the Committee 
held that “The sole purpose of Article 52 is to provide for an exceptional remedy in 
cases where there has been a manifest and substantial breach of a number of essential 
principles set out in this Article.” In addition, in CMS v. Argentine Republic the 
Committee’s ruling as regards its mandate under ICSID Convention was the same: 
“The Committee is conscious that it exercises its jurisdiction under a narrow and 
limited mandate conferred by Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. The scope of this 
mandate allows annulment as an option only when certain specific conditions exist.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic (Vivendi 
I), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, para. 69 (July 3, 2002)  
56 Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the 
Argentine Republic’s Application for Annulment of the Award, paras. 78-79 (June 29, 2010).  
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In addressing their authority to annul or not an award, many ad hoc Committees have 
repeatedly reinforced the discretionary nature of their powers; for instance, in 
Consortium v. Kingdom of Morrocco the Committee held that “[The Committee] 
should therefore refrain from making an annulment decision too hastily. It must do so 
only in case of manifest error, substantial breach or, more specifically, whenever the 
breach is such that, if it had not been committed, the Tribunal would have reached a 
different outcome than the one reached. To this extent, the ad hoc Committee retains 
a measure of discretion.”57  
Importantly, an annulment can only be based on the limited – neither narrowly nor 
broadly - interpreted grounds which are listed exhaustively in Article 52 of the 
Convention: i) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted, ii) that the Tribunal has 
manifestly exceeded its powers; iii) that there was corruption on the part of a member 
of the Tribunal; iv) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of 
procedure or v) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.58 
This is also embraced in several cases and ad hoc Committee’s decisions; for 
instance, in the Klockner v. Cameroon case, the ad hoc Committee held that “…in 
accordance with Article 52(1), the grounds on which an application is founded can 
only be the five grounds provided for in the Convention.” In Wena Hotels v. Egypt, 
the Committee reinforced the previous statement by noting that “The power for 
review is limited to the grounds of annulment as defined in [Article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention]”. Furthermore, in CMS v. Argentine Republic the Committee, adhering 
to this concept, stated that “…an ad hoc committee is not a court of appeal and that its 
competence extends only to annulment based on one or other of the grounds expressly 
set out in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention”. The same was the phrasing of another 
famous annulment decision in SEMPRA v. Argentine Republic: “Annulment review is 
limited to a specific set of carefully defined grounds (listed exhaustively in Article 
52(1) of the ICSID Convention).” The limited grounds upon which an annulment 
application can be filed demonstrates the purpose of the ICSID drafters to restrain the 
review of awards only to egregious errors of law and violations of fundamental 
principles of law within the realm of the investment arbitration community.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Decision of the ad hoc   
Committee on the Application for Annulment of Consortium R.F.C.C., para. 226 (January 18, 2006)  
58 Schreuer, C., 2003, “ICSID Annulment Revisited”, Kluwer Law International 2003	  
	   19	  
Although ad hoc Committees have asserted that they mainly review manifest errors of 
law - that they only “scratch the surface” – that is not the case always. Even if the 
latter allegation appears to be settled law in the ICSID community, when exercising 
its task, an ad hoc Committee, sometimes, gets quite into detail in order to explain 
whether the tribunal was right or wrong in its decision.59 
As evident as it may be, although there seems to be a crystallization of some 
principles regarding the approach and the stance of the Committees in the application 
and interpretation of these grounds, there are still some decisions amplifying the 
dichotomy between finality and correctness and undermining the desirable 
consistency and legal certainty in their application. Much criticism has been exerted 
by virtue of various ad hoc Committee’s decisions, on the basis that they exceeded 
their narrow mandate under the Convention by intruding into the merits of arbitral 
awards and reconstructing some parts therein60, instead of just annulling the award or 
dismissing the application. As a result, some confusion emerged as to the borderline 
between appeal and annulment mechanisms and it was further augmented due to the 
ad hoc Committee’s decisions in CMS61 and SEMPRA62. However, in a recent 
annulment decision - AES v. Hungary – the Committee’s approach to this matter 
purported to rectify the previous decisions’ arbitrariness by holding that “As 
unambiguously expressed in Article 53 of the Convention, an award is not subject to 
an appeal. Annulment must therefore be different from appeal. It is well settled in 
international investment arbitration that an ad hoc committee may not substitute its 
own judgment on the merits for that of a tribunal.”63 The same stance is adopted by 
the Committee in Duke Energy v. Republic of Peru, in stating that “An ad hoc 
committee, which is not an appellate body, is not called upon to substitute its own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Annulment and Judicial Review – How “Final” is an Award?, 2009, in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and International Law Vol. 2 (Ian A. Laird, Todd J. Weiler eds)  
60 Platt, R., 2013, “The Appeal of Appeal Mechanisms in International Arbitration: Fairness over 
Finality?”, Journal of International Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International 2013 Volume 30 Issue 5 ) 
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analysis of law and fact to that of the arbitral tribunal.”64   
This apparent inconsistency in the ICSID annulment regime appears to be linked with 
the inherent tension between the notions of finality and correctness.65 Considering 
that finality constitutes the primary goal of ICSID awards, ad hoc Committees should 
bear that in mind and yield precedence to finality over accuracy.66 This is embraced in 
M.C.I. v. Republic of Equador where the ad hoc Committee held that “It is an 
overarching principle that ad hoc committees are not entitled to examine the 
substance of the award but are only allowed to look at the award insofar as the list of 
grounds contained in Article 52 of the Washington Convention requires... 
Consequently, the role of an ad hoc committee is a limited one, restricted to assessing 
the legitimacy of the award and not its correctness. The Committee cannot for 
example substitute its determination on the merits for that of the tribunal...”.67 
Similarly in AMCO v. Republic of Indonesia, the ad hoc Committee’s point of view is 
stated as such: “The ad hoc Committee may refuse to exercise its authority to annul 
an Award if and when annulment is clearly not needed to remedy procedural injustice 
and annulment would unwarrantably erode the binding force and finality of ICSID 
Awards.”68  
 
C. The complexity of the tasks of an ad hoc Committee  
It is noteworthy that in the end, the role and tasks of the ad hoc Committees have 
proved to be something more than complex, often requiring an intensive interpretation 
of international investment law notions, which illustrates some lack of uniformity in 
the jurisprudence of investment arbitration. It is interesting how Broches addresses 
this issue: “Annulment is an essential but exceptional remedy. It is well understood 	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that the grounds listed in Article 52(1) are the only grounds on which an award may 
be annulled. However, the application of that paragraph places a heavy responsibility 
on the ad hoc committees, which must rule on requests for annulment. For example, 
in relation to a Tribunal’s alleged “excess of powers” they may have to make fine 
distinctions between failure to apply the applicable law, which is a ground for 
annulment, and incorrect interpretation of that law, which is not. With respect to 
allegations that a tribunal’s failure to deal with questions submitted to it constitutes a 
serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure, or failure to state the reasons 
on which the award is based, they will have to assess the relevance of those questions, 
that is to say, their nature and potential effect, had they been dealt with, on the 
tribunal’s award. They are also likely to be called on to give specific meaning to such 
terms as “manifest,” “serious departure” and “fundamental rule of procedure” in 
judging the admissibility of claims for annulment.” 
“After these determinations have been made on the basis of objective legal analysis, 
the ad hoc committees may be faced with the delicate final task of weighing the 
conflicting claims of finality of the award, on the one hand and, on the other, of 
protection of parties against procedural injustice, as defined in the five sub-paragraphs 
of Article 52(1). This requires that an ad hoc committee be able to exercise a measure 
of discretion in ruling on applications for annulment.”69 
As Christoph Schreuer notes “The two decisions in Wena and Vivendi rendered in 
2002 demonstrate that ICSID's review mechanism has found its proper place. It has 
abandoned the early activism of the Klockner case and now presents itself as what it 
was designed for: an unusual remedy for unusual situations. The recent cases have 
helped to dispel the fears about frequent attacks on awards for trivial reasons leading 
to protracted and expensive litigations.”70 
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6. The exhaustively listed grounds for annulment under Article 52(1) of the 
ICSID Convention 
 
 
  Limited grounds for review under Article 52(1)  
 
The annulment procedure is governed by Article 52(1) of the Washington Convention 
in which five possible grounds for annulment are set forth: i) improper constitution of 
the tribunal; ii) manifest excess of powers; iii) corruption on the part of a member of 
the tribunal; iv) serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure and v) failure 
to state reasons on which the award is based.71 These five grounds constitute the only 
threat to an ICSID award and the specific provision of the Convention should be 
construed pursuant to its object and purpose, neither narrowly nor broadly.72 This is 
foreseen by many annulment decisions embracing the reasonable use and 
interpretation of the grounds for annulment. For instance, in SEMPRA v. Argentine 
Republic, the ad hoc Committee held that “As for the interpretation of grounds for 
annulment there is compelling support for the view that neither a narrow nor a broad 
approach is to be applied…Nor is there any preponderant inclination “in favorem 
validitatis”, i.e. a presumption in favour of the Award’s validity” in response to the 
Argentine Republic’s application for annulment of the award. 73  Uniformly, in 
Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Committee’s approach coincides 
with the previous one in stating that “[T]he grounds for annulment set out in Article 
52 must be examined in a neutral and reasonable manner, that is, neither narrowly nor 
extensively.”74  
 
Out of the five grounds for annulment circumscribed in Article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention, only the four of them were invoked during annulment proceedings; these 
are: i) improper constitution of the tribunal; ii) manifest excess of powers; iii) serious 	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departure from a fundamental rule of procedure and iv) failure to state reasons on 
which the award is based.75 The most frequent grounds invoked by the parties are i) 
manifest excess of powers, ii) serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure 
and iii) failure to state reasons.76 As a consequence, these three grounds and their 
respective interpretation from ad hoc Committees shall be emphasized in this paper. 
 
I. Manifest Excess of Powers 
 
This ground for annulment primarily refers to incidents where the tribunal either 
exceeded its mandate by overstepping the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement, 
by including in its decision certain points, which were not contemplated by the parties 
or by failing to apply the proper law. Essentially, Article 52(1)(b) of the ICSID 
Convention deals mainly with the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and the issue of the 
applicable law. The expression excès de pouvoir manifeste stems from the French 
administrative law and it was substantially linked with arbitration law during attempts 
to establish a system for the review of arbitral awards.77 
 
The provision requires that the excess of powers be “manifest” and most of the ad hoc 
Committees have interpreted this notion as an “excess” that is obvious and self – 
evident.78 Some of the Committees have also attached weight to the interaction 
between the “manifestness” and the outcome of the decision of the Tribunal and 
whether the former materially affected the latter.79 
 
 
i) Lack, Excess or Non – Exercise of jurisdiction 
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The ICSID Convention strictly circumscribes some certain criteria that have to be 
fulfilled in order for a Tribunal to assert jurisdiction.80 These criteria are mandatory 
both for the parties and the tribunal; therefore, derogation from these rules, even by 
agreement, cannot be justified. It is now settled law that a tribunal is competent to 
decide on jurisdictional objections on its own on the basis of the commonly 
acknowledged principle of competence – competence.81 As a result, an annulment can 
only then be justified when, on the basis of a jurisdictional determination on behalf of 
the Tribunal, the competence exercised by the latter is evidently outside the scope of 
its mandate, leading in “manifest” excess of powers. 
 
In this context, the ad hoc Committee in Klockner noted: “Clearly, an arbitral 
tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction, whether said to be partial or total, necessarily comes 
within the scope of an ‘excess of powers’. Consequently, an applicant for annulment 
may not only invoke lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae or ratione personae under 
Articles 25 and 26, but may also contend that the award exceeded the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction as it existed under the appropriate interpretation for the ICSID arbitration 
clause.” 82  However, the ad hoc Committee, despite its allegations against the 
Tribunal’s decision, held that in the absence of any arbitrary element in the decision – 
making process of the Tribunal, the application could not lead to annulment.  
 
In the Vivendi case, the application for annulment was based on the fact that the 
Tribunal had exceeded its powers by asserting and exercising jurisdiction that it did 
not actually had. The ad hoc Committee rejected the applicant’s statements and in this 
regard it made a general statement in the following terms: “It is settled, and neither 
party disputes, that an ICSID tribunal commits an excess of powers not only if it 
exercises a jurisdiction which it does not have…, but also if it fails to exercise a 
jurisdiction which it possesses under those instruments… The failure by a tribunal to 
exercise a jurisdiction given it by the ICSID Convention and a BIT, in circumstances 
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where the outcome of the inquiry is affected as a result, amounts in the Committee’s 
view to a manifest excess of powers within the meaning of Article 52(1)(b).”83  
The Decision on Annulment in Vivendi v. Argentina constitutes a very interesting 
decision as it advances, first and foremost, the jurisprudence of annulment and 
secondly, by virtue of its specific content regarding the dichotomy between contract 
and treaty claims in investment treaty arbitration. 
 
Another significant case is Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo where the ad 
hoc Committee alleged that a manifest excess of powers was committed by the 
tribunal by virtue of exercising jurisdiction despite the fact that one of the 
requirements set forth in Article 25 was not met.84 It is interesting that the Committee 
in this case was accused of overstepping the borderline between annulment and 
appeal.85 
 
 
ii) Failure to apply the proper law 
 
Failure to apply the proper law is a valid and commonly – used ground for annulment 
of an ICSID award. The legal basis of this ground is set forth in Article 42(1) of the 
ICSID Convention, which provides as follows: “The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in 
accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of 
such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the 
dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law 
as may be applicable.” Thus, it is easily understood that in case that the Tribunal 
disregards the parties’ agreement as to the applicable law, this can lead to an excess of 
powers;86 similarly, an award decided on the basis of an aequo et bono judgment of 
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the Tribunal also may lead to an excess of powers.87 
Ad hoc Committees have frequently drawn the line between an erroneous application 
or misinterpretation of law and the application of the wrong governing law; the latter 
includes instances where tribunals do not apply any law or merely apply a law, which 
is not prescribed by Article 42(1) of the Convention. For example, the Committee in 
CDC stated that: “Common examples of such ‘excesses’ are a tribunal deciding 
questions not submitted to it or refusing to decide questions properly before it. Failure 
to apply the law specified by the parties is also an excess of powers.” “…so it exceeds 
its powers where it acts in contravention of that consent (of the parties)”.88 
It has been held that merely an erroneous application of the proper law, will rarely 
lead to annulment of the award, even if it affects the correctness of the decision.89 The 
Committees, in reviewing this ground for annulment, have narrowly interpreted their 
tasks and have adopted the view that i) their role is necessarily and legally constrained 
to simply ensure that the proper law was applied and not that the proper law was 
correctly applied90 and ii) that in order to be competent to annul an award, the errors 
must be “manifest”. 
In the absence of a parties’ agreement, Article 42(1) designates the law to be applied 
in the dispute by tribunals; in this case the tribunal shall apply “the law of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and 
such rules of international law as may be applicable." As Mr Gaillard has pointed out, 
international law plays an important role in this regard; many ad hoc Committees 
have argued that international law takes precedence on the understanding that the host 
State’s law contains gaps or there is discordance in the enunciation of their 
provisions.91 For instance, the ad hoc Committee in Klockner held that Article 42(1) 	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“…gives these principles (perhaps omitting cases in which it should be ascertained 
whether the domestic law conforms to international law) a dual role, that is, 
complementary (in the case of a "lacuna" in the law of the State), or corrective, should 
the State's law not conform on all points to the principles of international law.” 
“Article 42(1) therefore clearly does not allow the arbitrator to base his decision 
solely on the "rules " or "principles of international law.” 
 
II. Failure to State Reasons 
This ground for annulment is prescribed in Article 48(3) of the ICSID Convention and 
is deemed to be “the most difficult ground for annulment to apply and to analyze”.92 
According to Dolzer and Schreuer the rationale behind the obligation of a tribunal to 
state reasons is to adequately explain especially to the parties, the way and grounds on 
which the tribunal reached its decision.93  
The ad hoc Committees’ practice on the interpretation of this ground is still divergent. 
In MINE, the ad hoc Committee explained that the reasoning of an award should be 
such as to warrant that the parties be able to “follow the reasoning of the tribunal on 
points of fact and law”.94 The ad hoc Committee further maintained that an inquiry in 
the adequacy of the tribunal’s reasoning could essentially lead to an interference with 
the merits of the decision, in contravention with Article 53 of the ICSID Convention, 
which explicitly excludes any remedy of appeal.  
The ad hoc Committee in Wena made some general remarks as to the obligation of a 
tribunal to state reasons: “Neither Article 48(3) nor Article 52(1)(e) specify the 
manner in which the Tribunal’s reasons are to be stated. The object of both provisions 
is to ensure that the parties will be able to understand the Tribunal’s reasoning. This 
goal does not require that each reason be stated expressly. The Tribunal’s reasons 
may be implicit in the considerations and conclusions contained in the award, 
provided they can be reasonably inferred from the terms used in the decision”. The 	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Committee’s stance in Wena was more liberal in stating that “in case the award 
suffers from a lack of reasons which can be challenged within the meaning and scope 
of article 52(1)(e)…” and “if the ad hoc Committee so concludes, on the basis of the 
knowledge it has received upon the dispute, the reasons supporting the tribunal’s 
conclusions can be explained by the ad hoc Committee itself.”95 Even worse, the ad 
hoc Committees went so far as to reconstruct the reasons missing from the awards in 
Amco I96 and MINE97 and denied to annul on this ground.98 This demonstrates for one 
more time, that ad hoc Committees may sometimes “cross the line” between 
annulment and appeal, which has resulted in much adverse criticism by commentators 
and scholars. 
Recent practice shows that a tribunal’s reasoning is often linked with allegations of 
insufficient or contradictory reasons. In Vivendi, for instance, the ad hoc Committee 
found that “contradictory reasons cancel each other out” and that an ad hoc 
Committee should take into account that their mere existence does not necessarily 
amount to an illogical reasoning but it might simply reflect some actually “conflicting 
considerations” of the tribunal’s panel.99 Moreover, in CDC, the ad hoc Committee 
ephasised its restricted role in annulment proceedings by stating that when applying 
Article 52(1), the ad hoc Committee has to make sure that it “does not intrude into the 
legal and factual decision – making of the tribunal” and that the reasons stated by the 
tribunal must be “coherent, i.e. neither ‘contradictory’ nor ‘frivolous”.100 
It can be inferred from a variety of arbitral awards, that the tribunals’ reasoning often 
represents a minimalistic approach; that, consequently, might sometimes question the 
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legitimacy and the goals of the ICSID regime101 and as a result, the notion of finality 
seems to emerge again and possibly prevail over any discrepancies in the tribunals’ 
reasoning.  
 
III. Serious Departure from a Fundamental Rule of Procedure 
As Dolzer and Schreuer have pointed out “The seriousness of the departure requires 
that it is more than minimal and that it must have a material effect on the party…A 
rule is fundamental only if it affects the fairness of the proceedings”.102 This ground 
for annulment has been invoked in several cases but did not prove to be very 
successful. 
For instance, the ad hoc Committee in CDC stated that: “A departure is serious where 
it is substantial and such as to deprive the party of the benefit or protection which the 
rule was intended to provide…The violation of such a rule must have caused the 
tribunal to reach a result substantially different from what it would have awarded had 
the rule been observed. As for what rules of procedure are fundamental, the drafters 
of the Convention refrained from attempting to enumerate them, but the consensus 
seems to be that only rules of natural justice – rules concerned with the essential 
fairness of the proceeding – are fundamental.”103 
 
i. ‘Impartiality’ falling within the ground of procedural violations 
Impartiality has also raised concerns as a fundamental and essential requirement of 
the arbitration proceedings in general, and specifically as an element that affects the 
fairness of the proceedings and amounts to a ‘serious departure from a fundamental 
rule of procedure’. In this regard, even though the ad hoc Committee in Klockner 
embraced the importance of impartiality in the proceedings and in ICSID arbitration 
in general by stating that “…a sign of partiality, must be considered to constitute, 	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within the meaning of Article 52(1)(d), a ‘serious departure from a fundamental rule 
of procedure’ in the broad sense of the term ‘procedure’…”104, it nevertheless 
declined to annul the award on this ground.  
 
ii. The ‘right to present one’s case’ as a ground for annulment 
Moreover, there are many cases where the parties alleged a violation of their right to 
be heard; put differently, they asserted that the arbitrators based their decision on 
some arguments that were not contemplated by the parties before. Notwithstanding 
the general principle that an award should be based on the arguments presented by the 
parties themselves and therefore, the parties must be accorded a fair opportunity to 
present their cases, the ad hoc Committees have generally declined the concept 
according to which tribunals are strictly restrained in the parties’ arguments.105 In 
Vivendi, for example, the claimants claimed that they had no opportunity to elaborate 
on an issue, which in fact proved to be a decisive point of the decision of the tribunal 
and therefore failed to present their cases. The ad hoc Committee, though, even if it 
casted a certain degree of doubt in the Tribunal’s approach, it rejected the parties’ 
arguments in stating as follows: “From the record, it is evident that the parties had a 
full opportunity to be heard at every stage of the proceedings. They had ample 
opportunity to consider and present written and oral submissions on the issues, and 
the oral hearing itself was meticulously conducted to enable each party to present its 
point of view. The Tribunal’s analysis of issues was clearly based on the materials 
presented by the parties and was in no sense ultra petita. For these reasons, the 
Committee finds no departure at all from any fundamental rule of procedure, let alone 
a serious departure.”106  
In Klockner, the ad hoc Committee, although it did abide by the general concept 
adopted by other ad hoc Committees, it went even further rejecting the respective 
argument as to this ground and stating that “Within the dispute’s ‘legal framework’, 
arbitrators must be free to rely on arguments which strike them as the best ones, even 
if those arguments were not developed by the parties…Even if it is generally desirable 	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for arbitrators to avoid basing their decision on an argument that has not been 
discussed by the parties, it obviously does not follow that they therefore commit a 
‘serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure’.”107 
 
General remarks 
As surprising as it may be, ad hoc Committees seem to approach such issues with a 
certain amount of discretion that sometimes undermines the integrity and legal 
certainty of the ICSID system. Ad hoc Committees have undoubtedly been afforded 
discretionary powers when exercising their tasks concerning the annulment of awards 
and they certainly avail themselves of this particular right; they can either annul an 
award if they assume it is necessary to do so, whether by virtue of a ‘manifest excess 
of powers’ or a ‘failure to state reasons’ or due to a ‘serious departure from a 
fundamental rule of procedure, or maintain the finality and binding force of the award 
by rejecting the application for annulment. However, they must be very cautious with 
respect to the thin borderline between annulment and appeal mechanisms and thus, it 
is certainly not their task to reconstruct any missing or flawed reasons in the tribunal’s 
award or to try to explain in several paragraphs how the tribunal concluded its 
decision. This is apparently beyond their mandate and could possibly cast some 
serious doubts to the very legitimacy of the system. Finality is unambiguously the 
primary concern of investors and States but it cannot in any way, under such 
circumstances, outweigh the fairness and correctness of the decision – making 
process. 
 
7. Is There a Need for Reform? 
There is a broad consensus as to the evidenced extensive recourse to the ICSID 
annulment procedure and the attitude of ad hoc Committees that seems to raise some 
concerns about an alleged inconsistency in the system.108 Ad hoc Committees have 
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frequently treated alleged errors of law or fact in tribunal’s awards as a ‘stepping-
stone’ to proceed to a review on the merits of the decisions. Consequently, this has 
caused some serious concerns amongst the investment arbitration community, 
especially with respect to the fact of whether the annulment proceedings have began 
to resemble more to an appellate mechanism. Wena and Vivendi are two examples of 
a more ‘legitimate’ – within the legal maxims in ICSID arbitration – approach of ad 
hoc Committees where annulment was seen an exceptional remedy and would only 
then be justified, when alleged irregularities in the awards would inevitably lead to a 
different outcome if not committed. Although some ad hoc Committees were 
seriously accused of intruding into the merits of the tribunals’ decisions, as in 
Mitchell where Professor Gaillard stated: “in basing its review on the ‘coherence’ of 
the reasoning, the ad hoc Committee clearly engages in substantive review of the 
award at issue, in the same manner as the Amco and Klockner decisions…The review 
of the ‘coherence’ of the reasoning…relates to the substance of the reasons stated and 
the correctness of the reasoning”109, yet recent practice proves to be more promising; 
in recent applications for annulment, ad hoc Committees adopted the view of a more 
constrained standard of review, i.e. in Continental v. Argentina, Duke Energy v. Peru, 
AES v. Hungary and others. 
In light of two other significant cases, namely the Lauder and SGS cases, there have 
been vast scholarly commentaries about the need of coherence and consistency in 
investor – State dispute process, possibly outweighing the need for finality.110 On the 
basis of these two cases, Frank points out that an appellate body would “promote 
correct decision making and legal reasoning…” and that “an appellate body could 
restore faith in the system, promote consistency, provide predictability, and reduce the 
risk of inconsistent decisions to make the system sustainable and legitimate in the 
long term”.111 
It is an undisputable fact that investors and States continue to prefer finality in 
investor – State arbitration. This can be clearly demonstrated if one were to examine 	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the attitude of States towards the recent proposals of reform regarding the ICSID 
Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law. As fas as the respective reforms to the 
ICSID regime and the introduction of an appellate body are concerned, the ICSID 
Secretariat went through a Discussion Paper in 2004 in order to ascertain whether “an 
appellate mechanism is desirable to ensure coherence and consistency in case law 
generated in ICSID and other investor-to-State arbitrations initiated under investment 
treaties”112 The desirable response was not met though, and States seemed to attach 
more importance to finality over consistency and correctness.113 
As a general positivism concerning investment arbitration seems to prevail, Broches 
also notes, with respect to ICSID awards, that: “My conclusion is that after a 
breaking-in phase, traumatised by the exorbitant Klockner I pronouncements, the 
ICSID annulment process is ‘on track’, as subsequent decisions have rejected and 
corrected Klockner’s flawed interpretation of Article 52 and re-established annulment 
as the extraordinary and limited remedy designed by its drafters.”114 
Last but not least, it has been submitted that the creation of an appellate mechanism 
for the review of arbitral awards would indisputably foster consistency and legitimacy 
in the decision – making process.115 Nonetheless, one cannot disregard the main 
elements that still render arbitration a much desirable method of dispute resolution: 
speed, efficiency, flexibility, finality. Should an appellate body be created, we would 
have to face a two-tier system; a first-instance and a second-instance tribunal. As a 
result, that could in fact deter parties from having recourse to arbitration at all; it 
would undermine finality of awards, speed and efficiency of arbitration as a whole 
and in the end, it would affect the very legitimacy of the system. 
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Conclusions 
It is now more evident than ever that investor-State arbitration continues to present an 
unrivalled growth within the realm of international arbitration. Investors and States 
are even more willing to seek relief and recourse to investment arbitration, taking into 
account its several practical advantages: the jurisprudence of tribunals has managed to 
increase in an even higher degree its consistency; finality of awards as an ultimate 
goal is now embraced more and more by ad hoc Committees, eliminating adverse 
outcomes by previous decisions116, and the legitimacy of the system seems to be 
preserved by recent practice in the investment arbitration community of tribunals and 
ad hoc Committees. 
As mentioned above, investors and States continue to prefer finality over correctness 
and accuracy, since the overwhelming majority of investors manage to achieve the 
desirable outcome through investment arbitrations and do not need a second round of 
annulment or review proceedings, and States – especially the capital-exporting ones – 
tend to see themselves as potential investors in arbitrations, therefore attaching more 
importance to finality over substantive accuracy. Certainly, there is a part of the 
community that support accuracy and correctness of awards in a manner that could 
possibly outweigh finality. Nonetheless, we should bear in mind that investment 
arbitration was primarily created the serve the interests of the ‘key players’ in this 
field; investors and States. Were a more substantive review of awards to be 
established117, this would obviously be in contrast with the desires of the parties in 
such arbitrations. 
In addition, in is clear that the multiple regimes of maxims and the diversity of 
institutions and their respective goals might render the accomplishment of consistency 
even more difficult. However, the goal remains more or less the same: to promote 
foreign investments and offer a certain degree of protection to investors. Tribunals 
and ad hoc Committees are well aware of this concept and try, as recent practice 
shows, to embrace notions such as consistency, predictability, accuracy and legal 	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certainty, without at the same time undermining finality. In the end, it is rather a 
matter of proper balance. 
Finally, annulment as a remedy against incorrect awards should only then be deployed 
by parties, where there are extreme and rare circumstances of fundamental importance 
that require intervention, either through enforcement review in State courts or by 
means of an annulment application within the internal self – contained system of 
ICSID. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
